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4Abstract
Although research in the Middle East and elsewhere shows that 
women’s work is associated with greater gender equality in the household, 
the mechanisms by which work and earnings affect women’s status are 
poorly understood.  This study uses Egyptian survey data to determine 
whether the effect of women’s work on their status is mediated by the 
material transactions that accompany marriage.  Previous research on 
this topic has identified two important paradoxes.  First, Egyptian brides’ 
contributions to marriage expenses have increased as their earning 
potential has risen.  This contradicts the labor-value perspective, which 
posits that resources will flow from bride to groom so long as women are 
economically dependent on men.  The second paradox is that women’s work 
has not resulted in new entitlements for women as modernization narratives 
would predict.  Instead single women work intensively to accumulate the 
savings necessary to secure a good marriage, retire from the labor market, 
and claim the privileged status of housewife.  Neither paradox has been 
assessed using national data that allows other variables to be taken into 
account.  Here I do so while adding a third perspective, the bargaining 
perspective.  This perspective posits that marriage payments made to the 
bride, as well as assets she herself brings to the marriage, enhance her 
bargaining position.  Women’s employment and earnings after marriage 
should have the same effect according to this perspective.  Analysis of the 
2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey panel data is used to test each of 
the three perspectives and to explore the associations between women’s 
labor market activity, earnings, absolute and proportional marriage 
payments, and a measure of women’s status within marriage, namely their 
decision-making power.  Consistent with the existing literature, I find that 
the labor-value and modernization perspectives are refuted by the ELMPS 
data.  The bargaining perspective is only partially supported by the data, 
and I consider some of the social and legal barriers to the operation of the 
bargaining model in the final section of the paper. 
1.Introduction
Scholars have long held that women’s labor market participation 
fosters greater gender equality at the household level in the short 
run, and at the societal level in the long run. This is true of research 
5concerning developed and developing countries alike, and the Middle 
East is no exception (Papps 1992). Women’s employment and earnings are 
reported to include benefits such as greater outlays on children’s welfare 
(Hadinot and Haddad 1995; Namoro and Roushdy 2008), as well as greater 
autonomy for women themselves (Kabeer 1997; Kawar 1995; Nawar, Lloyd 
and Ibrahim 1995).  In spite of these findings, few of the mechanisms by 
which women’s work influences outcomes related to gender equality in the 
Middle East have been adequately accounted for.  Nor do we adequately 
understand the conditions under which the reported associations hold.  As 
a result, policymakers seeking to improve women’s status cannot be certain 
whether their interventions, be they providing economic incentives or 
altering cultural attitudes, will be effective. This study seeks to contribute 
to the existing literature by exploring the pathways linking women’s work 
and material resources to gender dynamics between husbands and wives 
in Egypt. The material resources in question consist primarily of the cash 
and assets women purchased or were given at the time of marriage. 
For single young men and women entering marriage in Egypt, the new 
relationships they are establishing with future partners and their families 
are marked by a variety of economic transactions.  Articles of clothing, 
jewelry, cash and real estate all change hands at well-defined junctures 
in the transition from singlehood to marriage.  In addition, a number of 
purchases are made in anticipation of joint use in the conjugal home.  Such 
household items range from decorative baubles to major appliances and 
furniture. Some of these transactions are gifts, albeit socially prescribed 
gifts. Others are legally sanctioned entitlements. All of the resources 
exchanged, however, require considerable outlays. In most cases brides, 
grooms and their families must save for years if they are to afford a marriage 
that conforms to prevailing notions of respectability.  The families of young 
women plan especially carefully for future marriage expenses to avoid the 
social stigma associated with women’s adult singlehood.  
Marriage payments are crucial to our understanding of women’s work 
and gender equality for at least four reasons. First, mounting evidence 
from Egypt suggests that a major motivation driving single women’s 
pursuit of wage work is the need to finance their own marriages (Amin 
and Al-Bassusi 2004).  If single women use marriages as a justification for 
working outside the home, it may help explain low rates of employment 
among women after they have married. Second, the emerging norm of 
female contributions to marriage payments requires that young women 
devote several years to wage work before they marry.  Some have argued 
that if women wish to marry at the appropriate age, they may trade off 
years of schooling in order to maximize time in the work force, thus 
6endangering recent gains in female educational attainment (Amin and Al-
Bassusi 2004). Third, it appears that women’s proportional contributions 
to overall marriage costs have increased over time (Singerman and Ibrahim 
2003). The institution of marriage and the respective financial obligations 
of bride and groom in household formation are clearly changing, and it 
may be that women’s labor market opportunities are behind those changes. 
Finally, other research has shown that married women derive power from 
the assets they purchased or were given at marriage (El-Kholy 2000). 
This indicates that the association between women’s work and later well-
being reported elsewhere may be mediated, in part, by marriage payments. 
A small but growing body of research exists on women’s work and 
marriage transactions in Egypt. If read through the lens of theories 
developed in other countries, two important paradoxes can be gleaned 
from this literature. First, Egyptian brides’ contributions to marriage 
expenses appear to have risen over time, rather than dropping alongside 
their growing earning potential (Singerman and Ibrahim 2003). This 
contradicts the labor-value perspective of marriage payments, which 
posits that resources will flow from bride to groom so long as women 
are perceived to be an economic burden on their husbands.  The second 
paradox is that the rising prevalence of women’s work has not resulted in 
new entitlements for women in the home and beyond as modernization 
narratives would predict.  Instead it appears to be a tactic used by women 
to ensure a favorable position in the existing patriarchal model of marriage 
– single women work intensively to accumulate the savings necessary to 
secure a good marriage and claim the coveted status of housewife (Amin 
and Al Bassusi 2004).
Both paradoxes, however, are in need of further substantiation.  While 
the first paradox has not been confirmed empirically, the second is based 
on a small-scale ethnographic study.  In this paper I first aim to test the 
conceptual perspectives from which these paradoxes arise. I then add 
a third perspective borrowed from the field of family economics: the 
bargaining perspective of marriage. This perspective posits that marriage 
payments which remain the bride’s property, as well as assets she herself 
brings to the marriage, enhance her bargaining position.  Women’s earnings 
after marriage should have the same effect according to the bargaining 
perspective. I evaluate this perspective by looking at the association 
between women’s work, marriage payments, and a measure of women’s 
status - women’s household decision-making. Data from the 2006 Egypt 
Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) are used to carry out multivariate 
analyses of the relationships between these factors, an approach that has 
7been absent from previous work. In addition to containing panel data, 
the ELMPS elicited detailed information on employment, earnings, and 
marriage payments. 
In the following sections of this paper I first describe existing research 
on marriage transactions in Egypt. I then touch on conceptual frameworks 
for their interpretation and derive hypotheses to test. Next, I introduce 
the ELMPS 2006 along with the measures to be employed in this study. I 
proceed to test hypotheses arising from the three conceptual frameworks 
laid out in the literature review, concluding with a discussion of my results.
2. Background and Review of the Literature
Customs that prevail across Arab communities of the Middle East 
dictate that the groom and his natal family bear the majority of the 
expenses associated with a new marital union. This usually entails costs 
associated with the wedding ceremony and celebration, the purchase 
and/or preparation of the conjugal home, a wedding ring or other jewelry 
(shabka), and, for Muslims, a sum of money paid as bride-price (mahr). The 
bride also may pay for the engagement, and she may bring limited goods 
such as clothing (kiswa), and certain items of furniture, kitchenware, and 
linens (collectively, gihaz) into the union. 
To date, the most thorough investigation of marriage transactions 
in Egypt is that of Singerman and Ibrahim (2003). In a comprehensive 
exploration employing data from both the 1995 Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) and a 1999 International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) survey (which was administered to 405 households with recent 
marriages), they show that the marriage of children is an important 
component of family savings and expenditures, and indeed of the national 
economy. Total marriage costs for couples who married in the years 1992-
1997 were on average 11 times as great as a household’s mean annual 
expenditure during those same years (Singerman and Ibrahim 2003).1  In 
a later study based on the 2006 ELMPS Singerman (2007) revises these 
estimates downwards, stating that middle class grooms must save their 
entire earnings for an average of 2.4 years to cover the costs of marriage.  
There is also a widespread perception in Egypt, apparent in literature, 
film and the media, that marriage is far more costly today than it was 
1     These costs encompass expenses borne by both the bride’s and groom’s sides, and are based on reports in 
the IFPRI data. For households above the poverty line, the average cost of marriage is 11 times annual house-
hold expenditures and for households below the poverty line, it is 12 times.
8in the past. The move towards nuclear households, the urban housing 
crisis, tight labor market conditions, consumerism and higher expected 
standards of living are thought to have rendered marriage unaffordable 
for some, resulting in the postponement of marriage, which is especially 
pronounced for men (Mensch et al 2005). Singerman and Ibrahim’s data 
corroborate the perception of rising costs of marriage.  But while they 
report that there appears to be a slight dip in marriage expenditures only 
for the most recent marriages (Singerman and Ibrahim 2003), Singerman 
finds that marriage costs began to decline steadily from 1975 and plateaued 
around 1995 (Singerman 2007). Assaad and Ramadan (2008) show that 
the trend of rising age at first marriage among Egyptian men has abated 
recently, and attribute this to the easing of the housing crisis. According 
to Binzel and Assaad’s (2008) analysis of men’s marriage timing, securing a 
stable job in the formal sector, rather than obtaining a first job in a timely 
manner, is the key prerequisite for men’s marriage. 
Many lay and scholarly explanations of marriage timing focus on men’s 
diminished labor market position. Men bear the majority of expenses 
associated with marriage in Egypt, but brides and grooms appear to be 
moving towards equal sharing of marriage costs over time (Singerman 
and Ibrahim 2003). Young women may have stepped in to compensate 
for men’s inability to cover marriage expenses, and therefore it may not 
be the economic hardship of men alone that has impeded marriage once 
the norm of female contributions has been established. Few accounts have 
acknowledged that young women also contribute heavily to the economic 
prerequisites of marriage and that their labor market experiences shape 
marriage behavior, in spite of ethnographic evidence that single women 
often seek wage work in order to save for marriage. Given the strong 
social stigma associated with women’s adult singlehood in Egypt, families 
plan carefully to ensure that their daughters make a suitable match at the 
appropriate age. The concern for marriage costs also influences young 
women’s decisions regarding education and market work. 
Drawing on in-depth interviews, Amin and Al-Bassusi (2004) claim 
that marriage is the main rationale for working cited by young single 
women. Earnings made in the years following their schooling allow young 
women to accumulate the material goods (gihaz) considered essential 
for marriage, which in turn makes them more attractive to potential 
suitors. Amin and Al-Bassusi (2004) report that the vast majority of single 
women interviewed planned to cease working upon marriage. They argue 
that traditional marriage values, with the role of the husband as that of 
breadwinner and the wife as dependent mother, have been reinforced as 
9women’s employment opportunities have expanded (Amin and Al-Bassusi 
2004).
A final source that discusses marriage transactions in Egypt is concerned 
with the ways in which women deploy their husbands’ marriage payments 
to secure advantages within marriage. El-Kholy (2000) discusses the 
marriage inventory (ayma) and its centrality to the negotiation of conflict 
in a low-income Cairo neighborhood. The ayma itemizes the furniture and 
supplies brought to the marriage by the bride (it sometimes includes the 
shabka as well), assigns an inflated monetary value,2 and is signed by the 
groom and two witnesses. The listed items can be claimed by the wife at 
certain times (in cases of abuse, expulsion from the home, or marriage to 
another wife) and in case of death of the husband or divorce.  Although 
it is an informal contract, El-Kholy shows that it may be enforced by 
community arbitration or considered a legally-binding contract in divorce 
courts. The ayma demonstrates the value of the bride to the groom and 
others, but perhaps more importantly, it is a form of insurance against 
vulnerability in marriage. The latter is especially salient, according to El-
Kholy, given rising costs of living, the growing role of female earnings, and 
the financial burden of divorce (El-Kholy 2000). 
3. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
It is possible to gain more purchase on the observations gathered by 
previous research by examining the evidence from Egypt through the lens 
of existing conceptual frameworks. Researchers have sought to understand 
marriage transactions in several ways,3 but I focus my attention in this 
analysis on three discrete perspectives that explicitly link women’s work 
to marriage transactions: the labor-value perspective, the modernization 
perspective, and the bargaining perspective. Each of these draws from the 
international literature on marriage transactions or women’s work4 but has 
particular relevance for Egypt, given what evidence exists at present. In 
what follows, I explore their utility for the Egyptian case.
2     The items included in the ayma and their value are the subject of negotiations between the families of the 
bride and groom around the time of engagement. 
3     See for example Sclegel and Eloul (1988), Bhat and Halli (1999), Goody (1973), Zhang and Chang (1999), 
Suran et al. (2004), and Goode (1959). 
4     Singerman and Ibrahim note that their finding of rising female marriage payments runs counter to expecta-
tions (2003: 86), given that it coincides with a period of growing female labor force participation in Egypt, but 
they do not link this to the theory of female labor-value or to modernization theory. Amin and Al Bassusi on the 
other hand, do make the conceptual link between their findings and modernization theory (2004: 1297). 
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The first of the interpretive lenses is the labor-value perspective. 
This perspective was first advanced by Boserup (1970). In her study of 
women’s status in Africa and Asia, Boserup argued that the organization of 
production drives marriage practices and the direction of resource flows 
at marriage in a particular community. In settings where women assume 
productive economic roles and are perceived to be important assets to the 
household economy, bride-price prevails because grooms must compensate 
the bride’s family for the loss of her labor. If women are economically 
dependent, however, dowry will be given by her family to her husband 
since he is taking on a burden (Boserup 1970). If we are to accept the 
labor-value perspective’s basic premises, it would appear that the Egyptian 
case presents a curious paradox. Egyptian women have participated in the 
wage labor market in rising numbers over the last several decades, and as 
a result their earnings have also increased relative to men’s.5 We would 
expect their contribution to marriage expenses to diminish alongside their 
growing labor value, but instead women’s contributions to the marriage 
fund appear to have grown (Singerman and Ibrahim 2003).
The second conceptual perspective is the modernization perspective, 
which reveals a second paradox in the Egyptian case. Modernization 
accounts of social and economic development would predict that growing 
labor force participation by women comes hand in hand with greater 
rights and privileges in private and public arenas.  However, the patriarchal 
family model appears remarkably resilient, and it strongly influences how 
and for how long women choose to engage in the labor market. As a 
result, women’s work opportunities may in fact lead to outcomes opposite 
to those predicted by the modernization narrative. We know from Amin 
and Al-Bassusi that some single women work expressly for the purpose 
of purchasing items for their gihaz, discontinuing their education so that 
they may marry early in their twenties. Their earnings ensure that these 
women can afford to begin childbearing early on, having left the labor 
force permanently once married (Amin and Al-Bassusi 2004). 
A third conceptual perspective is the bargaining perspective. This 
perspective is implicit to the work of El-Kholy, and to some extent Amin 
and Al-Bassusi’s, but I expand upon it here. According to the field of 
family economics from which the perspective originated, power flows 
from bringing resources to a relationship. A spouse can use economically-
based bargaining power (for instance income, property, or occupational 
status) to secure advantages within the relationship (England and Folbre 
2005). There is an assumption that bargaining in marriage occurs under the 
5     The last decade may be an important exception to this overall pattern. See Amer 2008.
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shadow of various threats. Economic resources6 affect what sociologists 
call women’s threat point. Women’s external threat point consists of what 
they have to fall back on if their marriage were dissolved. This can include 
women’s own income and savings, other sources of economic support 
such as fathers and brothers, as well as their prospects for remarriage. In 
the Egyptian case, the external threat point may consist also of their very 
ability to end the marriage,7 and their ability to reclaim items from the 
ayma from their husbands, or to extract a deferred dowry (muakhar sadaq).8 
Internal threat points consist of the things women can withhold within 
the marriage (failing to share income for example) and what that leaves the 
spouse to fall back on (Brines 1994; Bittman et al. 2003). 
The bargaining perspective suggests a number of ways in which marriage 
payments by both the bride and the groom enhance women’s bargaining 
position in marriage, deterring divorce and ill-treatment. If the bride’s 
contributions to the marriage fund are documented in an ayma, if she has 
received goods from her husband which remain her property (customarily 
the shabka gold and mahr bride-price are considered the bride’s, as well as 
all the household furniture), and if the groom has specified a muakhar, she 
can leave the marriage with some resources, which her husband would 
lose. This perspective would also predict that by working either before 
or after marriage, a woman’s dependence on her husband is reduced and 
her bargaining position within marriage is improved. Note, however 
that the pathway leading from women’s work to status in the family 
differs somewhat from the modernization narrative. Under the bargaining 
perspective, working may confer advantages on women because it directly 
increases their influence, but it may also operate indirectly if working 
6     There are of course non-economic sources of bargaining power. These may include any factor that confers 
status on women (prestigious family background or beauty). It may also include anything that facilitates exit 
for women (emotionally or financially supportive family members - male siblings may be especially impor-
tant in this regard) or makes exit from marriage detrimental for the husband (dependence on her for care or 
domestic work, or financial penalties for divorce). In fact one of the key shortcomings of the bargaining model 
is its neglect of the importance of third parties outside the married couple. (For accounts detailing their role in 
women’s lives see Hoodfar (1997), and Joseph (1999)) Unfortunately, many of these non-economic factors are 
not available as variables in the ELMPS data.
7     The Coptic Church, to which most Egyptian Christians belong, forbids divorce in all but a few exceptional 
circumstances. Although civil divorce is an option for Coptic women, the divorce may not be recognized by the 
Church or it may result in excommunication. For Muslims, divorce can be initiated by the husband quite easily. 
Women wishing to divorce, on the other hand, must undergo lengthy court procedures, although these have 
been streamlined somewhat since the passage of a new Family Status Law in 2000. 
8     The muakhar is a sum of money to which all Muslim wives are entitled upon divorce. Its value must be 
stipulated in the marriage contract, although a small symbolic sum is sometimes written into the contract as a 
sign of good will. 
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before marriage allows women to bring more resources to the marriage 
fund at the outset. Another important caveat is that the bargaining 
perspective has largely been tested in Western settings such as the US 
and Australia. The deal struck between men and women in these settings, 
or the ‘patriarchal pact’ to paraphrase Kandiyoti (1991) is predicated on 
certain social and economic conditions. The question remains whether 
the bargaining perspective’s predictions will hold in a different setting, that 
of Egyptian socieBased on the conceptual perspectives described above, 
the hypotheses to be examined can be summarized as follows:
 
Labor-Value Hypothesis 
1.  As the remuneration of women’s work before marriage increases, their 
proportional contributions to marriage costs will decrease.
2. As the remuneration of women’s work before marriage increases,  the 
absolute value of their marriage payments will decrease.
Modernization Hypothesis9
1. As the remuneration of women’s work before marriage increases, their 
decision-making within marriage will also increase. 
2. As the remuneration of women’s work after marriage increases, their 
decision-making within marriage will also increase.
3. As women’s educational attainment increases, their decision-making 
within marriage will also increase.
Bargaining Hypothesis
1. Women’s proportional and absolute contributions to marriage costs will 
be positively associated with their decision-making within marriage. 
2. The associations posited by the modernization hypothesis above will 
disappear once the wife’s contribution to the marriage fund is taken 
into account. 
These three perspectives are interrelated in a number of ways. The 
labor-value hypothesis attempts to arrive at the determinants of women’s 
marriage expenditures, which are the key predictors for the bargaining 
hypothesis. The bargaining and modernization hypotheses share in common 
a number of predictions regarding the positive effect of women’s work 
and earnings on their decision-making. However, as noted above, the 
two perspectives also compete with one another since the bargaining 
9     These predictions are also consistent with the bargaining perspective.
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perspective posits that the advantages women gain by working before 
marriage are actually due to the marriage payments that working allows 
them to afford. 
4. Data and Measures
Limited though it is, the evidence on marriage transactions in Egypt10 
raises a myriad of questions for further investigation. Singerman and 
Ibrahim (2003) do not test the association between women’s work and 
marriage transactions, and their descriptive findings are constrained by 
the small size of the IFPRI sample. Amin and Al-Bassusi’s (2004) and El-
Kholy’s (2000) work hints at the ways in which marriage transactions may 
have important ramifications for dynamics within the resulting marriage. 
However, neither study is able to generalize its findings to the wider 
population, nor to rule out the possibility that other important factors 
are at work. An analysis based on national data addresses limitation of 
inference as well as external and internal validity. In this section I first 
describe the survey data to be used in this study along with its advantages 
and disadvantages, followed by the key measures to be used in the analysis.
The ELMPS Data and Analysis Sample
The primary data source for this study is the 2006 Egypt Labor Market 
Panel Survey (ELMPS). The ELMPS is the second wave of a national 
survey first fielded in 1998. The 1998 wave of the survey interviewed the 
members of 4,816 households and was based on a two-stage stratified 
random sample. The 2006 wave re-interviewed 3,684 households from 
the original sample, as well as 2,167 households that had split from the 
original households. Of the respondents from the first wave of the survey, 
72.4% were successfully re-interviewed in the second wave(a total of 17,357 
individuals).11  A refresher sample was also drawn. In all 37,000 individuals 
aged six and older were interviewed in 2006 (Barsoum 2007). 
The analysis sample for this study consists of female respondents who 
were unmarried at the first interview and married by the second interview, 
a total of 1,110 women.  The panel design allows me to evaluate how single 
10    For accounts dealing with marriage transactions in other societies of the Middle East, see Papps (1984), 
Habibi (1997), and Moors (2003). 
11    Death, relocation abroad, refusal to participate, and inability to locate individuals who left the original 
households explain about 45% of the attrition (Assaad 2007). The remaining attrition is due to the random loss 
of records from the first wave of the survey. There were no systematic differences between the probability of 
attrition and individual characteristics in 1998 (Barsoum 2007). 
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women’s type of labor market engagement and earnings influence their 
subsequent marriage payments and status within marriage.
 
Dependent Variables
The key dependent variable in my test of the labor-value perspective is 
the material contributions of the bride to the overall expenses associated 
with her marriage.12 The ELMPS’s battery of questions on marriage costs 
asks women about the relative and absolute value13 of expenditures on 
each of several important items of the marriage fund. For example, it asks 
what the value of the furniture for marriage was, followed by a question on 
the percentage contribution to the cost of the furniture by the groom, the 
groom’s family, the bride and the bride’s family. Similar questions are asked 
for items such as jewelry for the bride, housing, celebrations, etc. For the 
labor-value hypothesis, interest is in the marriage payments made by the 
bride, which on average constituted only 2.14% of the overall marriage 
costs. I operationalize this as three variables. Because of the theoretical 
interest in relative and absolute marriage payments, I use measures of the 
bride’s share of the total marriage expenses (in percentage points) and 
of the bride’s own Egyptian pound payments (in hundreds of Egyptian 
pounds, standardized to 2006 values). Because the majority (89%) of brides 
reported making no contributions themselves to marriage costs, I also 
constructed a binary measure indicating whether or not the respondent 
herself made any payments towards her marriage expenses.
There are obvious disadvantages to relying on retrospective reports for 
information on marriage expenditures. Problems of recall, however, should 
be minimal since the respondents in question will all have married within 
the previous eight years. Moreover, marriage is a significant life event 
and many women will have documented these exchanges in a marriage 
inventory (ayma). 
The most important outcome for testing the modernization and 
bargaining perspectives has to do with women’s status. Many Egyptian 
survey questionnaires focus on the constructs of “autonomy” and 
“empowerment.” However, detachment and independence from others 
12    The labor value hypothesis predicts that women’s work and earnings before marriage will be negatively 
associated with their contributions to marriage costs. 
13    There are important conceptual implications to the choice of marriage payments measure, according to the 
literature on women’s resources. In a study using data on housework in the US, Gupta (2007) recently argued 
that women’s absolute earnings are more important to the domestic division of labor than their relative earn-
ings. This breaks with a long line of research that used women’s economic resources as determinants of power 
dynamics within marriage, and that relied on measures of women’s income relative to men’s to do so (see for 
example Brines 1994; Bittman et al 2003). 
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are attributes few Egyptian women value (Govindasamy and Malhotra 
1996) and research relating to these specific constructs is lacking. The 
ethnographic record suggests some things might be important to most 
women – the ability to make decisions which are consequential for their 
households, and freedom from physical abuse (Singerman 1995; Hoodfar 
1997). Unfortunately the ELMPS does not provide information about 
domestic violence. However, it does contain detailed information about 
women’s decision-making.  A battery of questions ask ever-married women 
who in their family usually has the final say in a number of decisions such 
as making large household purchases, visits to family and friends, getting 
medical treatment for a child, etc. The response categories include the 
respondent alone; the respondent and her husband jointly; the husband 
alone; the in-laws alone; the respondent, husband and in-laws jointly; 
and others. Exploratory factor analysis using the Principal-Components 
method confirmed that variables related to women’s decision-making 
loaded onto a single factor. For simplicity, I aggregated the variables 
for this factor into an additive index, with a lower score indicating less 
decision-making power, and a greater score indicating more.14 
Independent Variables
A number of predictors having to do with women’s employment are used 
in this analysis to test the labor-value and modernization hypotheses. My 
preliminary analyses tested a binary measure of whether or not members 
of the analysis sample were employed in 1998 (according to an extended 
definition of work) as an indicator of employment before marriage. But 
because women’s work experiences are extremely diverse, it makes little 
sense to lump all types of work together into a single category when testing 
the statistical effect of work on marriage payments or decision-making. 
While many Egyptian working women are waged employees, the majority 
of Egyptian women who are economically active work as unpaid family 
workers or are engaged in subsistence activities (Langsten and Salem 
2008). I therefore created three dummy variables for type of labor market 
engagement indicating whether respondents were wage workers, unpaid 
workers, or not working at all. These measures of type of labor market 
engagement were constructed for 1998, before the respondent married, as 
well as for 2006, after the respondent married. The second labor market 
measure used in this analysis is each woman’s monthly wage. This measure 
14    I assigned three points to women who reported that they alone take a given decision, two points to those 
who take the decision jointly with the husband, one point to those who take the decision jointly with the 
husband and in-laws, and zero points to all others. The decision-making score ranges from 0 to 30. 
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was constructed for both 1998 and 2006 and is measured in hundreds of 
Egyptian pounds (standardized to 2006 values), with those who were not 
working assigned a wage of 0 pounds. 
The predictor variable of interest for the bargaining hypothesis is 
women’s contribution to marriage expenses. As noted above, I use these 
items to construct three measures of women’s marriage payments. The 
first is a measure of the percentage contribution of the bride herself to 
total marriage costs. The second is a binary measure of whether or not 
she made any payments towards her total marriage costs. The third is a 
measure of the total payments (in hundreds of Egyptian pounds) made 
towards covering the costs of marriage, for those who made any payments. 
I also use a number of measures of the demographic characteristics of 
wives as control variables. The respondent’s age at marriage is included 
in the models that follow because the older the woman was at marriage, 
the greater her marriage contributions are likely to be, and the greater her 
decision-making power in 2006 is likely to be. 
The years of education completed by the respondent by 2006 is 
another important control variable. The relationship between years of 
education and marriage payments is ambiguous because more education 
might translate into less time in the labor market before marriage, or it 
might result in greater earnings at work. The wife’s years of education, 
however, should be positively associated with her decision-making power. 
I also include a dummy variable for whether the respondent was a student 
in 1998, to control for those who may not have had the opportunity to 
work in 1998. 
Rural residence is also included as a control variable. Rural residence 
before marriage should lead to lower marriage payments by the bride and 
should also diminish her decision-making score. 
The key measure of socioeconomic status in the ELMPS is wealth, 
as measured by a list of household assets. The bride’s household’s asset 
ownership in 1998 is available as an index ranging from -2.04 to 1.87, and 
should be associated with greater marriage payments on the part of the 
bride and greater decision-making for her after marriage.  
Kin marriage is relatively common in Egypt and in fact is an idealized 
form of marriage for some. I include a dummy variable indicating whether 
or not the respondent’s husband is a relative in the models that follow. 
In kin marriages, marriage payments are often reduced as a sign of good 
will between members of the same family. The association between kin 
marriage and decision-making is less clear, because although kin marriage 
is thought to be advantageous for the wife, it is more common in rural 
areas, where the wife’s decision-making power is lower. 
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About 25% of the analysis sample reported that they lived in an extended 
family arrangement when they first married. Because marriage costs are 
reduced considerably for those who do not set up their own households, 
I include a dummy for nuclear living at first marriage in my regression 
models. Women who lived with their husbands as a nuclear family at the 
start of their marriage are likely to have paid more than others towards 
marriage expenses, but their proportional contribution is likely to have 
been lower because of the high cost of housing, which is borne by the 
husband. Wives who lived independently, however, are likely to have 
greater decision-making power compared to those who lived as part of an 
extended family. 
Finally, I include two other variables which I expect to influence 
women’s status in my tests of the modernization and bargaining hypotheses. 
The first of these is a binary measure of whether the woman has any sons. 
There is a strong preference for male children in Egypt, and women can 
expect their status to be enhanced if they bear a son. The second variable is 
a measure of whether the respondent reports owning any property which 
she could sell if she wished. Women who own any property can use this as 
a bargaining chip, and therefore their decision-making power should be 
greater than women who own no property. Although the ELMPS elicits 
information about women’s ownership and control of property, it lacks 
data about its value. This may be an important omitted variable for the 
bargaining hypothesis, which is concerned with all of women’s economic 
resources, not just earnings or marriage-related cash and assets. 
Table 1. Cross-Tabulation of Dependent Variables with Selected Independent Variables 
(N=1,110)
Bride’s 
Proportional 
Marriage 
Payments
(Percentage)
Bride’s Absolute 
Marriage 
Payments
(Mean Egyptian 
Pounds)
Bride’s 
Decision-
Making Index 
(Mean Score)
Total 
Type of Labor Market 
Engagement, 1998
   Wage Worker
   Unpaid Worker
   Not Working
8.10%
1.45%
1.90%
2742 EGP
586 EGP
1106 EGP
15.09
11.43
13.15
10.91%
17.86%
71.22%
Monthly Wage, 1998
   0 EGP
   1-200 EGP
   201-400 EGP
   >401 EGP
1.81%
6.06%
7.27%
23.68%
988 EGP
1002 EGP
2012 EGP
14037 EGP
12.81
15.30
14.92
15.01
89.09%
4.62%
5.22%
1.06%
continued u
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Type of Labor Market 
Engagement, 2006
   Wage Worker
   Unpaid Worker
   Not Working
-
-
-
-
-
-
14.34
11.06
13.42
11.94%
20.02%
68.04%
Monthly Wage, 2006
   0 EGP
   1-200 EGP
   201-400 EGP
   >401 EGP
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
12.89
13.94
14.74
14.01
88.18%
2.63%
4.82%
4.37%
Years of Education
   0 Years of Education
   1-9 Years of Education
   10-12 Years of Education
   >12 Years of Education 
0.68%
2.84%
1.82%
4.30%
172 EGP
954 EGP
634 EGP
2798 EGP
10.76
12.69
13.51
13.95
15.64%
17.61%
39.86%
26.89%
Student in 1998
   Student 
   Not a Student 
2.20%
2.70%
1431 EGP
985 EGP
12.84
13.22
45.24%
54.76%
Wealth in 1998
   Poorest Third
   Middle Third
   Richest Third 
1.53%
2.18%
3.37%
356 EGP
1104 EGP
1828 EGP
11.64
12.75
14.15
26.52%
32.05%
41.43%
Rural Residence in 1998
   Rural
   Urban 
1.58%
3.32%
521 EGP
1831 EGP
11.77
14.23
47.69%
52.31%
Age at Marriage 
   Married Under 18
   Married Over 18
0.21%
2.80%
93.28 EGP
93.28 EGP
11.30
13.69
11.93%
88.07%
Bride’s Proportional 
Marriage Payments (%)
   0%
   1%-20%
   21%-40%
   >40%
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
13.35
13.38
15.29
17.39
89.30%
6.00%
3.37%
1.33%
Bride’s Absolute Marriage 
Payments (EGP)
   0 EGP
   1-5,000 EGP
   5,001-10,000 EGP
   >10,000 EGP
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
13.06
13.06
11.97
16.04
89.95%
3.36%
2.47%
4.21%
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Living Arrangements 
when First Married
   Extended Family
   Nuclear Family
2.25%
2.56%
725 EGP
1332 EGP
9.77
14.21
25.91%
74.09%
Kin Marriage 
   Husband a Relative
   Husband not a Relative
1.32%
2.82%
400 EGP
1423 EGP
12.60
13.18
21.60%
78.40%
Has Any Sons 
   Has Any Sons
   Has No Sons
-
-
-
-
14.94
11.16
50.23%
49.77%
Property Ownership 
   Owns Any Property
   Own No Property 
-
-
-
-
13.46
12.85
32.99%
67.01%
Source:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
5. Analysis and Results
The labor-value perspective makes two predictions regarding the effect 
of women’s work on their marriage payments. First, it states that the 
greater the remuneration of a woman’s work is before marriage, the lower 
her proportional contributions to marriage costs will be. Compared with 
their husbands, their husbands’ families, and their own families, female 
respondents in the ELMPS contributed the least to marriage expenses. 
This is consistent with the fact that the most expensive marriage item 
(housing) is borne by the husband according to custom. Because of the 
large number of zeros in the outcome variables measuring women’s share 
of marriage costs, a zero-inflated negative binomial regression was used in 
the analysis. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial model is also appropriate for 
regressions where the variance of the outcome variable is considerably 
larger than the mean. This model assumes that the sample comes from 
two populations, one where the count is always zero, and another where 
the count has a negative binomial distribution and is not always zero. 
Coefficients for the always zero population are estimated using logistic 
regression and are displayed in the top panel of the table. These coefficients 
are log-odds, which when exponentiated indicate the percentage increase 
or decrease in the odds of being in the always zero category.  Coefficients 
for the not always zero population follow a negative binomial distribution 
and are displayed in the bottom panel of the table. When exponentiated, 
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these represent the average increase or decrease in the outcome variable 
for each one unit increase in the predictor variable. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial regression model is not only used 
when the outcome of interest is bride’s percentage marriage contributions, 
but also when the outcome of interest is the bride’s decision-making 
power. The decision-making index also has an overcount of zeros and a 
variance that is larger than the mean, both of which are accounted for by 
the zero-inflated negative binomial model. 
Results from the analysis of the first labor-value hypothesis are shown 
in Table 2, with examples of the correct interpretation of the zero-inflated 
negative binomial coefficients illustrated in the text below. 
Table 2. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Testing the Effect of Type of Labor 
Market Engagement and Monthly Wage on Bride’s Share of Total Marriage Costs (Labor 
Value Hypothesis 1) (N=1,110)
Bride’s Share of Total Marriage Costs
 Model 1 Model 2
Inflate Constant 6.056*** 5.997***
Wage Worker in 1998 -1.123***
Unpaid Worker in 1998 -0.096
Years of Education  -0.080** -0.083**
Student in 1998 -0.292 -0.140
Wealth in 1998 0.378* 0.398*
Rural Residence in 1998 0.505 0.492
Age at Marriage -0.147*** -0.149***
Nuclear Living at Marriage 0.62 0.618
Husband a Relative 0.599 0.575
Monthly Wage in 1998 -0.448*
Constant 3.455*** 3.423***
Wage Worker in 1998 0.226
Unpaid Worker in 1998 -0.007
Years of Education  -0.025 -0.024
Student in 1998 0.183 0.127
Wealth in 1998 0.192* 0.185*
Rural Residence in 1998 -0.032 -0.055
Age at Marriage 0.002 0.005
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Nuclear Living at Marriage -0.218 -0.200
Husband a Relative -0.107 -0.104
Monthly Wage in 1998 0.061
Notes:  * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  Omitted category for the type of labor market engagement is ‘not 
working.’  Metric for monthly wage in 1998 is hundreds of Egyptian Pounds.  
SOURCE:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
Contrary to the labor-value hypothesis, Table 2 shows that brides 
employed as wage workers before marriage made higher percentage 
contributions to marriage costs compared to brides who were not working 
before marriage. Wage workers were 67.5% (exp( -1.123) = 0.325) less likely 
than non-workers to have made no contributions to the marriage fund 
(a result which is statistically significant), and on average contributed 
25.4% (exp(0.226)=1.254) more to marriage costs than non-workers (a result 
which is not statistically significant). Having worked as an unpaid worker 
bears no statistical association with proportional marriage contributions, 
compared to not working. The results displayed in the Model 2 of Table 
2 indicate that as the bride’s monthly wage in 1998 increased, her odds 
of contributing nothing to the marriage fund significantly diminished, 
contrary to the labor-value hypothesis.  Other noteworthy findings include 
the fact that the greater the years of education and age at marriage of the 
bride, the lower her odds of having contributed nothing to the marriage 
fund are. Not surprisingly, the wealth of the bride’s natal family is positively 
associated with higher average marriage contributions on her part. 
Second, the labor-value hypothesis states that the greater the 
remuneration of women’s work is before marriage, the lower the absolute 
value of their marriage payments will be. Women’s reported marriage 
payments ranged from zero Egyptian Pounds to approximately 90,000 
Egyptian Pounds, but because so many respondents made no marriage 
payments themselves, I use a logistic regression where the outcome 
variable is a binary measure of whether or not the respondent made any 
marriage payments. Results are displayed in Table 3 as odds-ratios. 
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Table 3.  Logistic Regression Testing the Effect of Type of Labor Market Engagement 
and Monthly Wage on Whether the Bride Made Any Marriage Payments (Labor Value 
Hypothesis 2)  (N=1,110)
Bride Made Any Payments
 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.008*** 0.009***
Wage Worker in 1998 2.870**
Unpaid Worker in 1998 1.391
Years of Education  1.077* 1.080*
Student in 1998 1.515 1.208
Wealth in 1998 0.781 0.767
Rural Residence in 1998 0.448* 0.463*
Age at Marriage 1.113** 1.118**
Nuclear Living at Marriage 0.397* 0.395*
Husband a Relative 0.602 0.611
Monthly Wage in 1998 1.366
Notes:  * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  Coefficients are odds-ratios. Omitted category for the type of labor 
market  engagement is ‘not working.’  Metric for monthly wage in 1998 is hundreds of Egyptian Pounds.  
Source:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
Table 3 shows that brides who were employed as wage workers in 
1998 were more likely to make payments greater than zero towards their 
marriage expenses compared to brides who were not working in 1998. 
This runs counter to the labor-value hypothesis. Compared to not working, 
being an unpaid worker in 1998 has no statistical association with making 
any marriage payments. The second predictor of any marriage payments 
in Table 3 shows a similar result in Model 2. Greater monthly wages in 
1998 are not significantly associated with any marriage payments having 
been made by the bride. Again, increasing years of education and age at 
first marriage raise the odds that the bride made any marriage payments, 
while rural residence and nuclear living at first marriage reduce the odds 
that the bride made any marriage payments compared to those who were 
urban residents and living in extended families. 
Table 4 displays regression results for the tests of the modernization 
hypothesis. Several predictions follow from the modernization perspective. 
First, greater remuneration in women’s work before marriage should be 
positively associated with their decision-making power after marriage. 
Second, greater remuneration in women’s type of labor market engagement 
and higher earnings after marriage should be beneficial for women’s 
23
decision-making power. Since the decision-making index is a score 
(ranging from 0 to 30) with an excess of zeros and a variance considerably 
larger than the mean, the analysis again relies on a zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression. 
Table 4.  Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Testing the Effect of Type of Labor 
Market Engagement Before and After Marriage on Wife’s Decision-Making Power 
(Modernization Hypothesis 1 and 2)  (N=1,110)
Decision-Making Index
 Model 1 Model 2
Inflate Constant -1.05 -0.881
Wage Worker in 1998 -0.365
Unpaid Worker in 1998 -0.02
Wage Worker in 2006 0.055
Unpaid Worker in 2006 0.193
Years of Education  0.005 -0.019
Student in 1998 0.055 0.242
Wealth in 2006 0.048 0.091
Rural Residence in 2006 0.198 0.223
Age at Marriage -0.026 -0.031
Nuclear Living at Marriage -1.185*** -1.132***
Husband a Relative -0.061 -0.009
Has Any Sons -1.032*** -0.985***
Owns Property -0.094 -0.189
Monthly Wage in 1998 -0.1
Monthly Wage in 2006 0.087***
Constant 2.419*** 2.374***
Wage Worker in 1998 0.059
Unpaid Worker in 1998 -0.088*
Wage Worker in 2006 -0.007
Unpaid Worker in 2006 -0.065
Years of Education  0.011* 0.013***
Student in 1998 -0.05 -0.05
Wealth in 2006 -0.014 -0.015
Rural Residence in 2006 -0.068* -0.093***
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Age at Marriage 0.001 0.002
Nuclear Living at Marriage 0.097* 0.101*
Husband a Relative 0.019 0.013
Has Any Sons 0.176*** 0.175***
Owns Property 0.018 0.014
Monthly Wage in 1998 0.029*
Monthly Wage in 2006 -0.006
Notes:  * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Omitted category for the type of labor market engagement is ‘not 
working.’  Metric for monthly wage in 1998 and 2006 is hundreds of Egyptian Pounds.  
Source:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
The results in Table 4 show that women’s wage work in 1998 is not 
associated with greater decision-making power after marriage, compared 
to women who were not working in 1998, as the modernization perspective 
would predict. However, among brides whose decision-making score 
was not always zero, being engaged in unpaid work before marriage is 
associated with significantly lower decision-making power than that of 
those who were not working before marriage. Surprisingly, women who 
report working currently are no different in their decision-making scores 
from those who do not work at present, again refuting the modernization 
hypothesis. Model 2 of Table 4 indicates that the higher the bride’s wages 
were before marriage, the lower her odds are of always having a decision-
making score of zero (although this is not statistically significant), and the 
higher her average decision-making score is after marriage (a finding that 
is significant at the .05 level). Other noteworthy findings include the fact 
that women with greater years of education, those who lived as a nuclear 
family at the start of marriage, as well as those who have a son, all have 
higher decision-making scores relative to other women. Women who are 
rural residents have reduced decision-making power compared to urban 
residents. 
Finally, Tables 5 and 6 display regression results testing predictions 
made by the bargaining hypothesis. Here the predictors of interest are 
the wife’s marriage payments (in both relative and absolute terms), and 
the outcome tested is the wife’s current decision-making power. The 
bargaining perspective predicts that women’s contributions to marriage 
costs will be positively associated with their decision-making within 
marriage. Because of the excess zeros in the decision-making index, a 
zero-inflated negative binomial model is used here. 
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Table 5. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Testing the Effect of Marriage 
Payments on Wife’s Decision-Making Power (Bargaining Hypothesis 1)  (N=1,110)
Decision-Making Index
Model 1 Model 2
Inflate Constant -1.21 -0.264
Bride’s Share of Total 
Payments
-0.035
Years of Education  0.023 0.05
Wealth in 2006 0.08 -0.064
Rural Residence in 2006 0.42 0.287
Age at Marriage -0.035 -0.089
Nuclear Living at Marriage -1.094** -1.069**
Husband a Relative 0.022 0.125
Has Any Sons -0.964*** -0.989**
Owns Property -0.149 -0.394
Bride Made Any Payments 0.118
Constant 2.337*** 2.282***
Bride’s Share of Total 
Payments
0.002
Years of Education  0.010** 0.010*
Wealth in 2006 -0.012 -0.002
Rural Residence in 2006 -0.094*** -0.093**
Age at Marriage 0.004 0.005
Nuclear Living at Marriage 0.100* 0.106*
Husband a Relative 0.015 -0.002
Has Any Sons 0.182*** 0.185***
Owns Property 0.015 0.017
Bride Made Any Payments 0.024
Notes:  * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  Bride’s share of total marriage payments is measured in percentage 
points.  
Source:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
The first column of Table 5 shows that, contrary to the bargaining 
hypothesis, the bride’s proportional contribution to marriage costs carries 
no statistically significant benefits for her decision-making power after 
marriage. Likewise, brides who made any payments are no different in 
their decision-making power from brides who made no marriage payments. 
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The bargaining hypothesis also predicts that the associations posited 
by the modernization hypothesis above (namely, that work and earnings 
before marriage enhance women’s decision-making power) will disappear 
once the wife’s contribution to the marriage fund is taken into account. 
But previously displayed tests of the modernization hypothesis showed that 
working before marriage is not significantly associated with any gains in 
later decision-making power for the wife. This result is shown again in 
Model 1 of Table 6, and in Models 2 and 3 of the same table we see the effect 
of adding measures of the bride’s marriage payments to the regression.  
Table 6. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Testing the Effect of Type of Labor 
Market Engagement on Wife’s Decision-Making Power, Controlling  for Wife’s Marriage 
Payments (Bargaining Hypothesis 2)  (N=1,110)
Decision-Making Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Inflate Constant -1.05 -1.479 -0.391
Wage Worker in 1998 -0.365 -0.52 -0.434
Unpaid Worker in 1998 -0.02 0.063 0.228
Wage Worker in 2006 0.055 0.238 0.029
Unpaid Worker in 2006 0.193 0.387 0.219
Years of Education  0.005 0.029 0.064
Student in 1998 0.055 -0.027 -0.133
Wealth in 2006 0.048 0.06 -0.094
Rural Residence in 2006 0.198 0.329 0.194
Age at Marriage -0.026 -0.027 -0.088
Nuclear Living at Marriage -1.185*** -1.035** -1.023**
Husband a Relative -0.061 0.006 0.103
Has Any Sons -1.032*** -0.956*** -0.987**
Owns Property -0.094 -0.208 -0.431
Bride’s Share of Total Payments -0.037                
Bride Made Any Payments 0.103
Constant 2.419*** 2.439*** 2.367***
Wage Worker in 1998 0.059 0.055 0.104*
Unpaid Worker in 1998 -0.088* -0.090* -0.074
Wage Worker in 2006 -0.007 -0.01 -0.01
Unpaid Worker in 2006 -0.065 -0.063 -0.081
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Years of Education  0.011* 0.011* 0.008
Student in 1998 -0.05 -0.053 0
Wealth in 2006 -0.014 -0.012 -0.001
Rural Residence in 2006 -0.068* -0.066* -0.064*
Age at Marriage 0.001 0 0.003
Nuclear Living at Marriage 0.097* 0.097* 0.097*
Husband a Relative 0.019 0.02 0.008
Has Any Sons 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.183***
Owns Property 0.018 0.022 0.026
Bride’s Share of Total Payments 0.001                
Bride Made Any Payments 0.013
Notes:  * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  Omitted category for the type of labor market engagement is ‘not 
working.’  Bride’s share of total marriage payments is measured in percentage points.  
Source:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
We see from Models 2 and 3 of Table 6 that marriage payments do not 
mediate the effect of the wife’s prior work on her decision-making. When 
measures of the bride’s contribution to marriage costs are included in the 
regression, the sign of the association between type of work and decision-
making remains unchanged, thus refuting the bargaining hypothesis. The 
exception to this is the negative association between decision-making and 
having been an unpaid worker in 1998, compared to having been a non-
worker 1998. Although the inverse relationship remains, the coefficient 
for unpaid worker becomes insignificant once the possibility that the 
bride made any marriage payments is controlled for. 
Table 7. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Testing the Effect of Earnings on Wife’s 
Decision-Making Power, Controlling  for Wife’s Marriage Payments (Bargaining Hypothesis 
2)  (N=1,110)
Decision-Making Index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Inflate Constant -0.881 -1.198 -0.208
Monthly Wage in 1998 -0.1 -0.19 -0.122
Monthly Wage in 2006 0.087*** 0.095*** -0.056
Years of Education  -0.019 0.001 0.059
Student in 1998 0.242 0.141 -0.157
Wealth in 2006 0.091 0.109 -0.072
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Rural Residence in 2006 0.223 0.39 0.265
Age at Marriage -0.031 -0.033 -0.091
Nuclear Living at Marriage -1.132*** -0.995** -1.067**
Husband a Relative -0.009 0.08 0.123
Has Any Sons -0.985*** -0.899** -0.989**
Owns Property -0.189 -0.27 -0.388
Bride’s Share of Total Payments -0.034                
Bride Made Any Payments 0.145
Constant 2.374*** 2.394*** 2.312***
Monthly Wage in 1998 0.029* 0.027 0.036
Monthly Wage in 2006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005
Years of Education  0.013*** 0.013** 0.011*
Student in 1998 -0.05 -0.052 -0.007
Wealth in 2006 -0.015 -0.014 -0.003
Rural Residence in 2006 -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.091**
Age at Marriage 0.002 0.001 0.004
Nuclear Living at Marriage 0.101* 0.101* 0.107*
Husband a Relative 0.013 0.013 -0.002
Has Any Sons 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.181***
Owns Property 0.014 0.018 0.016
Bride’s Share of Total Payments 0.001                
Bride Made Any Payments 0.014
Notes: * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  Metric for monthly wage in 1998 and 2006 is hundreds of Egyptian 
Pounds.  Bride’s share of total marriage payments is measured in percentage points.  
Source:  Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006
Table 7 tests whether the statistical effect of the bride’s earnings 
before marriage on her later decision-making power is actually due to 
the marriage payments she was able to make because of her earnings. We 
see from Model 1 of Table 7 that the greater the earnings of the bride 
before marriage were, the higher her average decision-making score is 
after marriage. However, when measures of the bride’s contribution to 
marriage expenditures are controlled for, this finding is reduced to non-
significance. This suggests that the positive consequences of high wages 
before marriage are due in part to the fact that those high wages allowed 
the bride to make purchases for her marriage, lending some support to the 
bargaining hypothesis.
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6. Conclusions
The findings reported in the previous section are synthesized according 
to each of the three conceptual frameworks and their corresponding 
hypotheses in Table 8. Table 8 shows that the relationship observed in 
the ELMPS data between women’s labor force participation, marriage 
payments, and women’s decision-making within marriage largely 
corroborates the paradoxes identified by earlier studies. 
Table 8. Summary of Findings for Hypotheses Generated by the Three Conceptual Frames
Conceptual 
Framework
Predictor
Variable
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
With Outcome 
Variable
Hypothesis 
according to ELMPS 
Labor-Value H1
Bride worked in 1998 Negative association 
with her proportional 
contribution to 
marriage costs
Not supported 
Bride’s wage in 1998 Not supported 
Labor-Value H2
Bride worked in 1998 Negative association 
with her total 
marriage payments
Not Supported 
Bride’s wage in 1998 Not supported 
Modernization H1
Bride worked in 1998 Positive association 
with current decision-
making power
Not Supported 
Bride’s wage in 1998 Supported 
Modernization H2
Bride worked in 2006 Positive association 
with current decision-
making power
Not Supported 
Bride’s wage in 2006
Not Supported 
Bargaining H1
Bride’s proportional 
marriage payments Positive association 
with current decision-
making power
Not Supported 
Bride’s absolute 
marriage payments
Not Supported
Bargaining H2a
Bride’s proportional 
marriage payments
Positive association 
between bride’s 
work in 1998 and 
decision-making will 
disappear
Not Applicable
Bride’s absolute 
marriage payments
Not Applicable
continued u
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Bargaining H2b
Bride’s proportional 
marriage payments
Positive association 
between bride’s 
wages in 1998 and 
decision-making will 
disappear
Supported
Bride’s absolute 
marriage payments
Supported
With regards to the labor-value perspective, all four regressions yielded 
results that run counter to this perspective’s prediction that women’s 
work will reduce their proportional and absolute contributions to the 
costs of marriage. Instead my results suggest that brides employed as wage 
workers before marriage made greater contributions to marriage costs 
relative to brides who were not working before marriage. Singerman and 
Ibrahim (2003) asserted that brides were shouldering a greater share of 
marriage expenses over time. While they expressed puzzlement that this 
had accompanied a rising trend in female labor force participation, they 
were unable to test a direct association between women’s work and their 
contributions to the marriage fund. The analysis presented here refutes 
the labor-value hypothesis and thus confirms the labor-value paradox: 
brides who reported working and receiving a wage before marriage were 
more likely to contribute to marriage expenses compared to other brides. 
The ELMPS data were also used to investigate whether the economic 
resources women bring to their marriages, be they in the form of marriage 
payments or work they performed in the labor market, improve their status 
and power vis a vis their husbands.  The modernization perspective would 
predict that work and earnings before and after marriage should enhance 
married women’s decision-making power. However, the associations 
between wage work and decision-making were not statistically significant. 
Having been an unpaid worker before marriage was actually found to 
significantly reduce decision-making power after marriage. While current 
earnings were not associated with decision-making, earnings in 1998 were 
positively associated with decision-making, the only finding that supports 
the modernization hypothesis. The modernization perspective’s prediction 
that women’s work and wages should come hand in hand with greater power 
vis a vis husbands largely does not hold in the ELMPS data, confirming 
the paradox identified in earlier studies.  The modernization perspective’s 
prediction that greater education for women should translate into higher 
status is, on the other hand, supported.
When the bargaining model is tested using women’s decision-making as 
an indicator of their status, findings only partially support the hypotheses 
posited at the outset of this paper. No association was found between 
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the bride’s marriage payments and her decision-making power within 
marriage. This paper’s tests of the bargaining hypothesis also sought to 
answer the question posed in the title of this paper, namely whether 
married women’s well-being depended on their work and wages or on their 
marriage payments. The answer to this question is mixed. Surprisingly, 
women’s decision-making is not affected by their type of labor market 
engagement either before or after marriage, and it is more strongly 
influenced by wages before marriage than current wages. However, the 
positive effect of wages on decision-making is not independent of any 
marriage payments the bride might have made with her earnings. In other 
words, married Egyptian women gain advantages from having high wages 
before marriage. However, this advantage is due to the contributions to 
marriage costs that their earnings allowed them to make. 
How can we understand the unexpected finding that marriage payments 
do not conclusively enhance married women’s status by serving as a 
bargaining chip vis a vis their husbands? The results reported here could 
be due to the narrow measures of women’s status employed in this study, 
but they may also be attributable to other factors. One possibility could be 
that gender trumps money. A number of studies of the effect of women’s 
economic resources on the household division of labor in the United 
States show that economic resources are not enough to overcome long-
entrenched norms of greater female involvement in housework (Brines 
1994; Bittman et al 2003). In Egypt as in the United States, being a woman 
is still a better predictor of one’s place in the marital power balance than 
one’s economic resources. If anything, my findings suggest that women 
who do secure more decision-making power do so through the gendered 
institution of the family. Marrying into a nuclear family setup and having 
a son are the factors most strongly associated with greater power for 
the wife. In other words, success in the patriarchal order leads to non-
patriarchal outcomes. 
Another explanation could lie with the socio-legal context in Egypt. 
In other words, the social and legal regulation of marriage and divorce in 
Egypt may hinder the bargaining hypothesis from operating in the same 
manner as it does in the settings in which it has previously been studied.  
The bargaining hypothesis’ predictions regarding the effect of women’s 
earnings and marriage assets on their well-being hinges on women’s 
perceived ability to retain economic resources in the event of marital 
conflict. If El-Kholy’s findings (2000) are unique to the community she 
studied, and women are unable to lay claim to marriage items they acquired 
at marriage, the arguments of the bargaining hypothesis will not hold. 
32
Customs govern what marriage fund items come to be considered the 
wife’s property in Egypt.15 Islamic law stipulates that the mahr and jewelry 
are the property of wives, which must be returned upon divorce, while 
Egyptian family law often awards furniture and other household items to 
women in the event of a divorce. To what extent do such formal rules map 
onto practice when it comes to actual cases of marital dissolution? In a 
study of 368 judicial divorce cases handled by the new Family Court, Al 
Hennawy (2009) reports that 88% of all the women surveyed reported 
that they gave up their rights to their marital property. Interviews that 
I conducted with a number of lawyers who have represented women in 
divorce proceedings on a pro bono basis confirmed that divorcing women 
rarely obtain the furniture and other household items they received at 
marriage. Although courts recognize the ayma as evidence, it is Criminal 
Courts rather than Family Courts which deal with the return of the marital 
property listed in the ayma. This means that women undergoing divorce 
who wish to claim items of furniture they purchased or were given at the 
time of marriage must initiate separate proceedings in Criminal courts in 
order to do so. Legal activists whom I interviewed, along with Al-Sharmani 
(2009) and Bernard-Maugiron (2008) report that many women resort to 
khul` divorce, in which women give up all their financial rights, in order to 
forgo the lengthy proceedings and uncertain outcomes of ordinary divorce. 
This means that a much greater proportion of divorcing women end up 
with few of the items which are legally their own property. Together these 
findings suggest that items of the gihaz that are customarily considered 
to be the bride’s property cannot operate as a means of leverage for the 
wife, since in practice she cannot expect to retrieve these items from her 
husband in case of divorce. This may explain why the bargaining hypothesis 
finds only weak support in this study.
This discussion of the socio-legal context in Egypt brings me to my 
final point. Bargaining theory presupposes certain institutional conditions, 
conditions which are crucial if its predictions are to hold. In the United 
States, where bargaining theory has been tested most extensively, these 
conditions include an abundance of cheap housing, religious pluralism, 
and legal changes which have improved women’s property entitlements. 
15    Zelizer (1996, 2005) makes an interesting distinction between payments that are entitlements, gifts, or 
compensation. If a good given by a groom to a bride at the time a marriage is contracted is understood to be 
a gift, it may or may not be considered appropriate that she sell it later on, but there would be no expecta-
tion that it be returned to him should the marriage fail. The mahr is often referred to as an entitlement due to 
women in Egypt, and jewelry as a gift. But these categorizations are often blurred, and they shift according 
to social context, making it difficult to predict how such understandings affect women’s control over assets 
received at marriage.
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Egypt, in contrast, is characterized by expensive housing, leaving women 
who wish to leave their husbands little choice other than moving in with 
their parents. Religious conservatism is also on the rise in Egypt, creating 
a normative environment in which divorce is frowned upon. And while 
legal protections for women are on the books, they are not enforced 
properly. Therefore it appears that theories that have predicted greater 
power for women as their access to economic resources and labor market 
opportunities increased, have limited utility for societies which lack the 
abovementioned institutional conditions. 
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